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Summary
The article examines population development with a focus on migration in 
post-WWII South-East Europe (SEE) – this macro-region understood as composed 
of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Hungary. While today the 
impression prevails that SEE suffers from continued population decline, decline 
is demonstrated to be a phenomenon just of the period after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, with remarkable population growth in the period before. Emigration 
from SEE is directed to both Western Europe and other countries of the region. It 
means in general brain drain and economic loss for the region. As revealed by a 
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survey carried out in 2010 in Serbia, emigration potential is high especially with 
the younger and better educated due to dissatisfaction with the current economic, 
social and political situation.
1 Preliminary notes
The main aim of this contribution is to present an overview of demographic 
developments in south-East Europe with a special emphasis on migration. however, 
the presentation of an overview of migration in South-East Europe is difficult due to 
the complex situation in this area. The established definition of international migration 
based on the UN recommendation (united nationS 1998) – a change in place of 
living over national borders, lasting a least between three and twelve months – is 
not applicable to the data available from many official statistical offices in South-
East Europe (GárdoS & Gödri 2014). With the sole exception of slovenia, there are 
no south-East European countries that have robust population registers and so all 
demographic indices should be used and considered with care.1
Apart from these statistical considerations, the following article will present three 
different perspectives that shed light on migration to and from south-East Europe. The 
first chapter presents a general overview of population development, beginning with 
the 1950s and with a specific focus on the net migration based on UN data (faSSMann, 
MuSil & GruBer 2014; faSSMann, MuSil, Bauer, MeleGh & GruBer 2014). The second 
chapter offers a description of the size and structure of emigration from south-East 
Europe reflected by the Austrian microcensus. Finally, a short analysis of potential 
emigration from South-East Europe exemplified by the information of a specific survey 
from serbia will be characterised (faSSMann 2012).
2 south-east europe: Demographic developments
2.1 Population growth and decline
south-East Europe – being the states of the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulga-
ria, Albania, greece and hungary – is quite diverse; the countries differ politically and 
economically, but also in terms of their historical development.2 some countries are 
1 more than this: one can study the relationship between the process of collecting statistical 
information and national interests. in many countries of south-East Europe the census includes 
people who are “temporarily absent” to keep the population number as high as possible. few 
countries would readily admit that their population is decreasing due to emigration and a 
declining expectation of wealth and security for the people who stay.
2 south-East Europe is a highly disputed geographical category. Especially the question 
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European Union (EU) member states, others are candidate countries, and others still 
are outside the EU with or without a future perspective of becoming a member (so-
called ‘third countries’). From a historical perspective, it is difficult to imagine this 
group as a homogenous space. From a demographic perspective it is less difficult, as 
the demographic processes in south-East Europe have been similar, as will be shown 
in this research.
south-East Europe became an area of demographic growth in the past 60 years, 
growing from a population of roughly 58 million inhabitants in 1950 to 70 million in 
1970 and 79 million in 1990. Therefore, the predominant perception of population 
decline in the region is misleading. An increase over 40 years of around 21 million 
people (around 36%) is startling and in 1990, shortly before the fall of the iron curtain 
and a new era of national independence, the population in south-East Europe was the 
highest it had ever been.
Table 1: south-east europe: Population development 1950-2011
Country 1950 1970 1990 Census 2001 Census 2011
Change in 
%	from	
2001
Albania 1,214 2,139 3,447 3,069,275 2,821,977 -8.1
Bosnia-
herzegovina 2,661 3,564 4,308 3.922.205 3,791,622 -3.3
Bulgaria 7,251 8,490 8,819 7,928,901 7,364,570 -7.1
greece 7,566 8,793 10,161 10,964,020 10,815,197 -1.4
Kosovo 2,000,000 1,800,000 -10.0
croatia 3,850 4,169 4,517 4,437,460 4,284.889 -3.4
macedonia 1,230 1,568 1,909 2,022,547 2,062,294 2.0
montenegro 399 519 609 620,145 625,266 0.8
Romania 16,311 20,253 23,207 21,699,700 20,121,641 -7.3
serbia 6,732 8,173 9,569 7,498,001 7,120,666 -5.0
slovenia 1,473 1,670 1,927 1,964,036 2,061,085 4.9
hungary 9,338 10,315 10,376 10,198,315 9,908,798 -2.8
south-east 
europe in 
total
58,025 69,653 78,849 76,324,605 72,778,005 -4.6
sources: for 1950, 1970 and 1990: united nationS 2015, World Population Prospects: The 
2012 Revision. URl: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm; 28/02/2015; for 
2001 and 2011: Census returns published by the offices of national statistics; the exceptions: 
Bosnia and herzegovina (preliminary results); macedonia (aborted census 2011; updated status 
31/12/2013); slovenia (census count as of 31/12/2013)
of whether hungary and Romania are included has not been answered uniformly (clewinG & 
SchMitt 2011) 
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However, population figures have dropped since the fall of the Iron Curtain, as 
shown by the population of 73 million people in the 2010s, a decrease in 4.6% or 
-0.46% per year. This fall in population is particularly the case for Albania, Bulgaria, 
Romania and serbia, with those countries having a rate of at least 5% over ten years. 
Albania’s population shows the highest decrease in the region with 8.1%. During 
the socialist period of the country, the population of Albania tripled, and Romania, 
Bulgaria and Bosnia-herzegovina saw a pronounced population growth. The historical 
growth is, to an extent receding, but when looked at over a longer period, the extent of 
that decline is relativised.
2.2 Fertility decline and convergence
One of the causes of population growth in south-East Europe between 1950 
and 1990 was the high fertility levels and the further consequences of a relatively 
young age structure. At the beginning of the 1950s, the age-standardised and period-
specific fertility rates (total fertility rate = TFR) were 6.11 in Albania, 4.82 in Bosnia-
herzegovina and around 4 in montenegro and macedonia, a particularly high rate. The 
Table 2: total fertility rate (period fertility), 1950-2010
Country 1950-1955
1960-
1965
1970-
1975
1980-
1985
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
2005-
2010
Albania 6.11 5.86 4.76 3.40 2.83 2.59 2.15 1.75
Bosnia-
herzegovina 4.82 3.81 2.63 1.99 1.53 1.54 1.23 1.22
Bulgaria 2.53 2.22 2.16 2.02 1.55 1.20 1.24 1.43
croatia 2.76 2.27 1.96 1.96 1.52 1.54 1.36 1.43
macedonia 4.01 3.59 2.87 2.50 2.16 1.81 1.58 1.48
greece 2.29 2.20 2.32 1.96 1.37 1.30 1.28 1.46
hungary 2.69 1.86 2.06 1.82 1.74 1.38 1.30 1.33
montenegro 4.03 3.26 2.63 2.17 1.81 1.84 1.78 1.73
Romania 2.87 1.95 2.62 2.25 1.51 1.31 1.28 1.34
serba 3.22 2.57 2.36 2.32 1.96 1.74 1.55 1.41
slovenia 2.58 2.34 2.21 1.87 1.36 1.25 1.23 1.44
south-east 
europe in total 3.16 2.66 2.38 2.02 1.61 1.46 1.33 1.34
source: united nationS 2015, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
URl: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm; 28/02/2015
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southern South-East European countries, with agrarian and Muslim influences, entered 
this transformative transitional phase at the beginning of the 1950s. in hungary, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Slovenia, however, this so-called ‘first demographic transition’, 
characterised by the rising gap between the lower mortality rates and higher birth rates, 
occurred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.
in the 1970s and 1980s the fertility rate in all countries of south-East Europe 
fell, but this became much more pronounced following the fall of the iron curtain. The 
introduction of a completely new socio-economic system, the removal of rewards for 
larger families (financial aids and larger flats), and increased poverty for whole sections 
of society led to a rapid fall in birth rates. in some countries, other elements explain 
the significant decrease of the total fertility rate (TFR). For example, in Romania the 
law forbidding abortions, decreed in the 1960s to increase the population size, was 
changed in 1990. however, more than this: A pessimistic economic outlook always 
leads to a decline in fertility rates.
The differences that existed between the East and West in terms of regional 
disparities of reproductive behaviour have also largely disappeared. The second 
demographic transition characterised by birth rates sinking below the mortality rates 
and therefore producing a natural population decline, is generally speaking the case 
for the whole region (van der Kaa 2008). in 2010, only two countries – Albania and 
Montenegro – had a TFR over 1.5, which is also insufficient sustaining the population 
levels. The reported TfR for the whole region was 1.34, placing it without any doubt 
in the lowest fertility regions of the EU-27, which has an average of 1.53 (2010).
2.3 Net migration: Development and geographical pattern
The low fertility rate – and consequent low birth rate – are the reasons for 
the middle and long-term decline in population. The cause of the short-term fall in 
population lies with the dominant emigration, not just for the period following the fall 
of the iron curtain, but for the whole period under consideration. As regards fertility 
decline and the increase in life expectancy, the collapse of the communist regimes 
in south-East Europe seems to be overemphasised, but this is not the case for the 
emigration-related developments. since 1950, south-East Europe has shown a negative 
emigration balance of almost 5 million people, measured for the whole population this 
accounts for an almost 10% population loss.
migration has developed in different ways within the individual countries and 
was linked to the internal political and economic crises, and migration-related political 
decisions. The support for guest-worker migration through bilateral agreements with 
germany, Austria and switzerland on one side, and Yugoslavia on the other, also 
contributed greatly to the negative migration balance in south-East Europe in the 1960s 
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and 1970s. The oil crisis, along with the end of the active recruitment from abroad at 
the beginning of the 1970s led to an almost neutral migration balance (see Table 3).
Table 3: estimated international migration balance, 1950-2010 (residual 
method; in thousands)
Country 1950-1960
1960-
1970
1970-
1980
1980-
1990
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
2005-
2010
Albania -9 -9 -9 48 -391 -303 -290 -151
Bosnia-
herzegovina -177 -296 -160 -46 -1025 233 38 -19
Bulgaria -162 -8 -138 -206 -356 -107 -83 -83
greece 35 -244 341 273 465 297 54 54
croatia -140 -145 10 221 -93 -201 - 30 -0
macedonia -45 -70 -76 -125 -130 29 4 -9
montenegro -1 -23 -24 -21 -19 -21 -6 -3
Romania -27 -27 -30 -248 -411 -328 -52 -55
serbia -15 -178 -13 -38 428 -203 -324 -241
slovenia -43 - 36 45 109 -16 1 17 45
hungary -150 - 6 45 -219 97 79 66 96
south-east 
europe in total -733 -1040 -9 -253 -1453 -524 -605 -365
source: united nationS 2015, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
URl: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm; 28/02/2015
The estimated figures of the migration balance following the fall of the Iron 
curtain in the 1990s are particularly high. however, there are also strong inter-regional 
complexities. Emigration from Bosnia-herzegovina as a consequence of the Balkan 
wars at the beginning of the 1990s was at the same time immigration to serbia and 
croatia. Emigration from Albania for economic reasons meant immigration to greece. 
The same was true for migration from Romania to hungary. south-East Europe is not 
only interlinked with Western Europe, but also with the other states within the region. 
The UN Population Division detects a degree of stabilisation that has been reached 
and that the international net-migration balance is tending in the long-term to return to 
a positive one. This is, however, still a point of speculation. countries such as serbia, 
Albania and Romania are still particularly hard hit by out-migration. in the past decade, 
the negative rate of out-migration has reached -565,000 for serbia (for a population 
of around 7 million people), -441,000 for the much smaller Albania (population: 2.8 
127 Migration to and from South-East Europe
million) and -110,000 for Romania. in reality, this negative migration balance could 
be even higher. Romanian statistics, however, include people who are “temporarily 
absent”. Therefore the official population number seems to be overestimated and the 
calculated migration balance underestimated.
3	 Migration	from	South-East	Europe:	the	Austrian	
perspective
migration out of south-East Europe is for some countries a migration to Western 
Europe, particularly – due to social and historical links – to Austria, switzerland and 
germany. As with a mirror statistic, the perspective can be altered, looking instead 
at net-migration to immigration to these states. Due to the availability of excellent 
statistical data, Austria presents itself as a good example for this exercise.
3.1 Size of the migration from South-East Europe
in the years 2004-2013, Austria has shown a migration surplus of +337,000 
people. This positive balance is significant, equivalent to the population of a small 
Austrian federal state (of which Austria is divided into nine). Austria is therefore – also 
politically acknowledged – an immigration country.
Of this surplus of +337,000 migrants, 138,000 are from south-East European 
countries and therefore represent 41% of the net migration. With accession to EU in 
2004 and 2007 and the expiry of transitional rules restricting the freedom of migration, 
the share of migrants coming from south-East European countries has risen, reaching 
50.3% in 2013. south-East Europe is therefore – statistically speaking – an extremely 
important region for Austrian in-migration. from the opposite perspective, Austria is 
an important target destination for emigration, along with germany, switzerland, italy 
and greece (especially for out-migration from Albania).
Particularly important for Austria are the south-East European countries 
Romania, serbia, hungary and Bosnia-herzegovina, countries representing 80% 
of incoming migrants. Whilst the migration of people from the West Balkan states 
has stagnated, the rates for people coming from the new EU member states has risen 
considerably. The integration of hungary, Romania and Bulgaria into the common 
European migration zone is therefore the most important development since the guest 
worker migrations.
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Table 4: Immigration to austria: migration balance with the south-east 
European	countries,	2004-2013
Country 2004 2007 2010 2013 total 2004-2013
Albania 168 78 36 177 1.065
Bosnia-herzegovina 2,632 890 530 2.416 13.851
Bulgaria 567 1,201 1,225 1,615 9.784
greece 31 42 179 775 2.080
croatia 787 162 18 2,826 5.162
macedonia 1,043 407 514 692 5.466
montenegro . 38 12 80 226
Romania 1,861 5,752 4,986 5,700 38.849
serbia 6,762 476 1,484 2,060 23.492
slovenia 180 196 198 1,630 4.284
hungary 988 1,767 2,163 8,456 29.922
south-East Europe total 15,019 11,009 11,633 27,505 137.614
migration balance Austria 50,826 25,470 21,316 54,728 336.980
share of south-east europe 
in the total migration 
balance	in	%
29.5 43.2 54.6 50.3 40.8
source: own calculations based on www.statistik.gv.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/wan 
derungen/wanderungen_mit_dem_ausland_aussenwanderungen/index.html (28.2.2015)
3.2 Structural characteristics of in-migration
Using the Austrian microcensus it is possible to analyse one step further by 
looking at who those people migrating from south-East Europe to Austria are and 
what attributes they bring with them. however, there are statistical limitations: the 
microcensus is a stratified, random sampling of around 1% of the households located 
in Austria. Due to this limitation given by the number of interviews, it is not possible to 
draw any conclusions about those coming from specific and small countries. Therefore 
a more broad geographical classification is used – like EU-2 (Romania and Bulgaria) 
or West Balkans (serbia, croatia, montenegro, macedonia, Albania and Kosovo) – to 
characterise migration from south-East Europe.
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Table 5:	 Age	of	the	population	by	citizenship	(in	%)
austria Western europe eU-10 eU-2
West 
Balkans
rest 
of the 
world
total
Under 15 14.5 12.0 14.3 16.8 25.2 17.1 14.7
15-40 30.4 41.4 47.3 40.1 52.0 50.1 32.1
40-65 36.5 35.6 35.5 37.4 21.1 27.3 36.1
Over 65 18.5 11.0 2.8 5.6 1.7 5.5 17.1
total 7,399,652 214,633 110,698 72.057 291,098 246,294 8,334,432
source: own calculations based on the microcensus 4/2011 (made available by StatiStiK 
auStria)
A first count related to the age structure of the population living in Austria 
according to country of origin allows conclusions concerning the strongest motives to 
migrate: high numbers of 25-45 years old suggest a strong labour-market orientation. 
When dealing with higher numbers of older people it might be assumed that migration 
is a result of push factors (political crisis, conflicts, wars, etc.) independent from the 
signals of the labour market in the countries of origin and destination.
migration to Austria between 2004 and 2007 from the EU member states – and for 
the West Balkan countries – is clearly a labour migration one. The main employment 
ages dominate and the proportion of older people is below average. it is only for the 
former Yugoslavian countries that the number of migrants under 15 (25%) is markedly 
higher than the average. This is a result of the higher fertility rates amongst women 
from these countries who have been in Austria for a longer time already, but it is also a 
consequence of the more muted future perspectives (Kosovo and serbia) and a higher 
number of asylum seekers.
The microcensus also recorded information about the highest level of education 
completed according to country of origin and shows a similar differentiation. migrants 
from the West Balkans vary greatly from the migrants from Romania and Bulgaria or 
the countries that joined the EU in 2004. Of persons from the West Balkans living in 
Austria, 46% have only completed compulsory schooling. in comparison, the number 
of qualified migrants is much lower. The picture is very different for the qualification 
profile of the migrants from EU-10 and EU-12 countries. Almost half of the migrants 
from countries which joined the EU in 2004 (for example hungary) living in Austria 
have completed high school or have a qualification from a higher education institute 
(degree-level or equivalent), for migrants from Romania and Bulgaria it is almost 
40%.
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Table 6: Highest level of education of persons aged 15 years+ according to 
nationality	(in	%)
austria West europe eU-10 eU-2
West 
Balkans
rest 
of the 
world
total
compulsory 
education 24.1 11.5 12.2 17.9 46.5 49.0 25.1
Apprenticeship 36.8 24.9 29.3 35.7 33.0 11.1 35.5
Vocational 
secondary school 13.8 9.4 9.1 7.6 6.0 4.4 13.0
grammar school 13.9 21.5 31.1 26.3 12.8 14.6 14.4
University 11.4 32.7 18.4 12.6 1.8 20.9 12.0
total 6,325,051 188,884 94,856 53,919 242,111 204,190 7,109,011
source: own calculations based on the microcensus 4/2011 (made available by StatiStiK 
auStria)
in this way, it is clear that ‘brain drain’ plays an important role for the countries 
of south-East Europe. This is also the case in the West Balkans, but the numbers 
for the post-guest worker migration also remain high.3 A young and well-educated 
section of society does not consider their home country capable of providing the 
same development opportunities available in the wider European migration zone. 
many individual studies carried out in the various sending countries have reported 
a high degree of willingness to migrate and have classified this as one of the most 
important and pressing socio-political challenges facing south-East Europe (horvath 
2004; BreinBauer 2008). “As a result, brain drain of highly skilled individuals and 
more generally of the most dynamic parts of the population of sEE (i.e. its youth) 
is considered as being one of the main obstacles for the future development of this 
region. The main causes of emigration, high unemployment rates and especially high 
youth unemployment rates, are only further perpetrated by the brain drain process.” 
(GranditS 2007)
Despite their level of education, those who migrate to Austria are not always 
employed in jobs that reflect their qualifications and are more likely to be unemployed 
than Austrians or migrants from the EU-14 countries. ‘losing’ their previous 
qualifications is the price that migrants very often have to pay. They need much longer
3 The term ‘post-guest worker migration’ describes the structure of migration in continuation 
of the guest worker migration in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, Austria as well as germany and 
Switzerland actively recruited low-qualified blue collar workers to fill gaps in the employment 
sectors. After the recruitment stopped, this type of low-skilled migration decreased, however, 
due to family reunification further relatives of the guest workers with similar skill and education 
profiles came to Western Europe.
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Table 7:	 Employment	of	the	working-age	population	by	nationality	(in	%)
austria Western europe eU-10 eU-2
West 
Balkans
rest of 
the world total
self-employed 
agriculture 4.9 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.4
self-employed 
general 9.2 10.9 11.6 16.8 2.7 8.0 9.1
Blue collar 
workers 24.6 15.9 41.8 51.7 73.6 57.5 27.5
White collar 
workers/state 
officials
61.3 73.0 46.2 31.5 23.6 34.2 59.1
Total 3,682,800 122,873 64,806 34,170 151,261 105,961 4,161,871
labour force 
participation rate 
(15+ population)
58.2 65.1 68.3 63.4 62.5 51.9 58.5
Unemployed 
in % 3.6 7.4 10.8 10.5 7.3 12.1 4.3
source: own calculations based on the microcensus of 4/2011 (made available by StatiStiK 
auStria)
to establish themselves within the labour market and are much more likely to take 
on work that does not match their qualifications. Migrants from Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe work as waiters, 24-hour care assistants and nurses, hairdressers and 
housekeepers, builders and technicians, but also as office assistants and qualified 
workers in the iT sector. One third is salaried employees, more than half are blue-collar 
workers and in many cases they are self-employed outside agriculture and forestry. 
self-employment was in many cases a way to circumvent the transitional migration 
rules, but sometimes an opportunity to found new businesses, often in construction, 
transport and personal services.
An aspect beyond the scope of the microcensus is a migrant group that can be 
seen in public space – often causing debate and discussion – but which is difficult to 
quantify precisely: beggars, newspaper sellers, people who beg for the coins from 
supermarket trolleys, homeless people and sex workers (enenGel & reeGer 2015). 
The public discussion about these groups of migrants has led to an inflated perception 
of the scale of the problem and an intensified debate about mobility within the EU and 
the unequal treatments of EU citizens in relation to social transfers.4
4 This debate is almost unavoidable, as social transfers are based on citizen solidarity, which 
in turn is based on a sense of community and a feeling – supported by the state – of a common 
‘we’. This is yet to occur on the European level and so non-Austrian EU citizens who draw on 
social security are considered skeptically, if they have not yet “paid their dues” in the form of 
tax. A common European identity is still not strong enough to expect solidarity on the matter.
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4	 Migration	expectations	in	South-East	Europe:
	 the	Serbian	example
This final section looks at the views of potential migrants from South-East 
Europe; structural characteristics, expectations and perspectives. The relevant 
empirical groundwork was done as part of a project about democracy in unstable social 
spaces.5 At the centre of this project was a survey carried out in November 2010 with 
approximately 1,200 respondents in Belgrade [Beograd], the Vojvodina and central 
Serbia about the influence of return migrants on the democratic processes in Serbia, as 
well as the general attitudes towards emigration in society.6
4.1 Extent and structure of those prepared to migrate
“if serbia becomes a member of the EU, would you leave for another EU 
country?” was the key question in the investigation of how willing people were to 
migrate. Of those asked, 6.5% were undecided, 51.8% said ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely 
no’, but 17% said ‘probably’ and 24.7% said ‘definitely yes’. Of course that does not 
mean that if serbia were to join the EU that a quarter of the population would simply 
up and leave, but it does indicate a high level of dissatisfaction amongst the general 
population with the current situation and the high expectation of a positive outcome if 
they were to go abroad.
This willingness to migrate was consistent throughout the population. however, 
two characteristic features seemed to combine, which influenced the decision one way 
or the other: self-estimation of their own human capital and economic conditions in the 
region in which they live. Of those questioned in Belgrade, 34.2% said that they would 
definitely or probably emigrate if Serbians were granted the same working rights 
within the EU, whilst 50.6% in the economically weaker central serbia – a region 
characterised by small-scale farming and a dwindling industry – said that they would.
The second dimension is related to personal characteristics. Older people are 
well aware of the fact that their employment opportunities abroad would be limited, 
and were less likely to express interest in potentially migrating (10.6% of people 
aged 60+). On the other hand, 74.3% of those aged 15-29 responded that they would
5 The project was led by Prof. Dieter SeGert, Vienna University, and financed by the Austrian 
National Bank and the federal ministry for science and Research (Project number: 13741).
6 The survey was based on face-to-face interviews conducted by the “Permanent field 
Network” of the centre of Political sciences and Opinion Research of the institute of social 
sciences in Belgrade (institut društvenih nauka). The sample procedure was complicated and 
contains a stratified random sample of the population in three different regions in Serbia (sample 
“basic population”) and a specific random walk procedure to register return migrants (sample 
“return migrants”).
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Table 8: age, education and religion of those prepared to emigrate from serbia 
(in	%)
If serbia becomes a member of the eU, would you leave 
for another eU country?
Definitely,	
probably Undecided
Perhaps, 
definitely	not
Age
15-29 74.3 8.8 17.0
30-44 54.1 9.9 36.0
45-59 33.3 6.3 60.3
60+ 10.6 1.4 88.
Education
compulsory schooling 32.7 6.5 60.8
Apprenticeship 39.0 7.3 53.7
secondary school 47.4 6.8 45.7
University 49.2 5.3 45.5
Religion
Orthodox 42.3 6.4 51.2
muslim 47.2 11.1 41.7
catholic 26.1 4.3 69.6
Other 28.6 71.4
No religion 50.0 3.6 46.4
total 41.8 6.4 51.8
source: inStitut društvenih nauKa; own calculations and collections (sub-sample „basic popu-
lation“; N=880)
probably move to the EU if it was possible. 47.4% with a secondary education and 
49.2% with a tertiary education said that they would use the opportunity to move 
within the EU if it was available to them.
The final differentiation was in terms of religious beliefs and ethnic background. 
This has less to do with the personal estimation of their employment opportunities; 
rather it is an expression of attachment to their home region and the particular living 
conditions for ethnic minorities. Those respondents that showed a sympathy to the 
‘western democracy’, who considered serbia to be part of the ‘West’, viewed a possible 
EU membership positively, took the question of Kosovo less seriously and in no way 
looked back positively to the single-party system of the past were those most likely to 
want to take the advantage of the EU mobility. Orthodox serbians express a stronger 
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wish to stay in serbia than the muslim population or especially the catholic Roma. 
The Roma in particular expressed an above-average willingness to leave serbia to live 
in the ‘West’.
4.2 Destinations, reasons and expectations
Almost 42% of those who said that they would probably or definitely migrate for 
work in the EU if the opportunity presented itself, chose the same destinations as the 
ex-Yugoslavians and later the serbian migrants were interested in: germany, Austria 
and italy and (of countries not in the EU), switzerland. The reasons that people showed 
an interest in these countries was also recorded: better jobs with higher incomes and the 
opportunities available to people in terms of employment and career are much better. 
furthermore, reasons relating to the social welfare state are also mentioned: social 
security, solidarity and general safety were also seen as pull-factors, along with the 
wish to live in a democratic state and the guarantee of human rights and – interestingly 
– a more developed approach to environmental issues. factors such as the proximity to 
serbia and the availability of an ethnic network appeared less prominently.
in light of these plans and expectations it is possible to determine that less than 
10% of serbians who showed a high propensity to emigrate wanted to leave serbia for 
less than a year, almost 30% for a period of one to three years, and around 60% for 
longer than three years, until they retire, or forever. This demonstrates a very high level 
of dissatisfaction with the living conditions in serbia, as usually in surveys like this 
respondents emphasise a shorter period of absence. in reality, these short-term plans 
often become longer in stages. Such significant willingness to leave for longer periods, 
or indeed permanently, is unusual.
A further question asked was what people intended to do with the capital gained 
from their time abroad if they return home. A positive effect for the regional economic 
development would be if that capital would be invested in new enterprises. in this 
way, returning migrants would have a stimulating effect and be a dynamic element in 
regional development. However, such an optimistic assessment was difficult to expect 
given the answers to the question. One quarter needed their income to support their 
family and relatives with day-to-day costs; a quarter were saving to be able to build 
a house or buy property; another quarter mentioned similar uses. The final quarter of 
those asked wanted to save to establish their own business upon their return.
A final question addressed what general effects might be expected from a period 
of working abroad. The most commonly given answer was the expectation of an 
increase in work morale and work ethics. in this way, labour migration was considered 
an instrument for increasing the country’s ability to compete internationally.
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further expectations included improving language skills, increased awareness of 
green issues, cultural openness and tolerance. At the same time, those willing to leave for 
work abroad expressed concern that negative effects might be the increased importance 
of material goods, money and a disproportionate emphasis on the importance of work. 
formulated differently: the way of living in serbia, the importance of the family and 
friends, as well as the relative unimportance of material goods might be lost should a 
more ‘Western’ lifestyle be adopted.
5 Conclusion
All findings and evidence seem to support the conclusion that, despite the 
historical, political and social differences in south-East Europe the population is now 
decreasing after decades of population growth, caused by a decline in fertility and 
continued out-migration. This out-migration is at the same time immigration mostly 
to germany, switzerland and Austria, italy and greece. Based on the migration to 
these countries, it is possible to see that it is young and well-qualified people, often 
working under the level of their qualifications. However, they send money home to 
their families, which indirectly contributes to regional stability. Human capital flows in 
one direction and savings capital in the other, the often complained about ‘brain drain’ 
becomes a phenomenon aimed at securing an existence.
in terms of migration policy, it is also noteworthy that south-East Europe and 
Western Europe form a functionally united migration space, which neither the countries 
of origin nor destination wish to acknowledge. There is no systematic exchange of data 
between the statistics agencies, no mobility partnerships with the third countries of 
south-East Europe and no regular meetings between those responsible for the social 
policy in the home and destination countries of the migrants that could support a real 
migration process.
migration could become a ‘triple-win’ situation where migrants, home regions 
and destination countries all benefit. However, that would require political collaboration 
and include migration management that incorporates such aspects as the ability to 
transfer pension entitlements, data exchange, the recognition of qualifications or 
perhaps assistance for returning migrants and related economic development measures. 
There is – at best – the beginning of attempts in this direction, however, a common 
political approach to this topic is still – unfortunately – a long way off.
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